Henry Potter and Kevin Mitchell challenge reductive views in neuroscience by introducing richer, temporally extended notions of causality. It argues for re-centering cognition and the organism as genuine causal agents in explanations of behavior. Read here.
Abstract: In neuroscience, the search for the causes of behaviour is often just taken to be the search for neural mechanisms. This view typically involves three forms of causal reduction: first, from the ontological level of cognitive processes to that of neural mechanisms; second, from the activity of the whole brain to that of isolated parts; and third, from a consideration of temporally extended, historical processes to a focus on synchronic states. While modern neuroscience has made impressive progress in identifying synchronic neural mechanisms, providing unprecedented real-time control of behaviour, we contend that this does not amount to a full causal explanation. In particular, there is an attendant danger of eliminating the cognitive from our explanatory framework, and even eliminating the organism itself. To fully understand the causes of behaviour, we need to understand not just what happens when different neurons are activated, but why those things happen. In this paper, we introduce a range of well-developed, non-reductive, and temporally extended notions of causality from philosophy, which neuroscientists may be able to draw on in order to build more complete causal explanations of behaviour. These include concepts of criterial causation, triggering versus structuring causes, constraints, macroscopic causation, historicity, and semantic causation—all of which, we argue, can be used to undergird a naturalistic understanding of mental causation and agent causation. These concepts can, collectively, help bring cognition and the organism itself back into the picture, as a causal agent unto itself, while still grounding causation in respectable scientific terms.
